A Kantian Own Goal

If we cannot want what we want, if our wants are not self-determined, then in what sense is the view of the self as an uncaused originator of action that lies behind the Christian idea of the soul, the Kantian noumenal self and the Cartesian ego adequate? Or, to bring it back to [Wayne] Rooney, if the impulse that leads him to turn his back to goal, leap, and strike a cross back over his shoulder and into the top corner pre-exists his conscious volition to do so, in what sense is that his goal?
     That again raises two questions. First of all, if it’s not Rooney, then who or what is it? It’s something behind the Cartesian cogito, perhaps analogous to Freud’s id, or the autre of Rimbaud, something primal and, frankly, rather disturbing given western society is based on the notion that the self has free will and is responsible for its actions.